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from the Early Exercise of Exchange Traded Stock Options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the early exercise of Chicago Board Options Exchange listed calls by 
different classes of investors over the 1996-1999 period.  We present two main findings.  First, 
there are a large number of early exercises that can be identified as clearly irrational without 
invoking any model of market equilibrium, and these exercises are not uniformly distributed 
across the investor classes.  Customers of discount brokers and customers of full service brokers 
both engage in a significant number of irrational exercises while traders at large investment 
houses exhibit no irrational early exercise behavior.  Second, irrational exercise is triggered both 
by the underlying stock price attaining its highest level over the past year and by the underlying 
stock having high past returns.  Our findings provide evidence that prospect theory is operative in 
the options market and that it applies differentially across various classes of investors.
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It is well-known that in the absence of market frictions it is irrational to exercise 
American call options early except in some circumstances just before the underlying stock goes 
ex-dividend.  Even in the presence of market frictions, it is possible to identify – without the 
imposition of any model of market equilibrium – call exercises which are clearly irrational.  In 
this paper, we employ a previously unavailable data set to analyze the rationality of early 
exercises of Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) calls over the 1996-1999 period by 
customers of discount brokers (discount customers), customers of full service brokers (full 
service customers), and traders at large investment houses trading for their firms’ own accounts 
(firm proprietary traders.) 
We present two main findings.  First, there are a large number of early exercises that can 
be definitively identified as irrational, and irrational exercise activity is not evenly distributed 
across the investor classes.  Discount customers and full service customers both execute a 
significant number of irrational exercises.  Firm proprietary traders, by contrast, carry out no 
early exercises which can be shown to be irrational.  Second, irrational exercise is triggered for 
both discount and full service customers by two events.  The first event is the underlying stock 
attaining its highest price level over the past 52 weeks, and the second event is high returns on 
the underlying stock over any of a number of past time periods.  Each of these events triggers 
irrational exercise by discount and full service customers even after controlling for the other 
event. 
In addition to providing new information on the behavior of different types of option 
market investors, our results contribute to an important debate over a large body of evidence that 
has emerged over recent decades which suggests that investors behave irrationally.  The 
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interpretation of this evidence has been controversial, because in almost all cases it can be 
explained either by investor irrationality or by misspecification of the model of market 
equilibrium against which the rationality of investor behavior is judged.1  Our evidence is a 
noteworthy addition to the existing pool, because the interpretation of it as a manifestation of 
investor irrationality is not conditional on any model of market equilibrium.  Instead, it requires 
only the very weak assumption that investors prefer more money to less. 
Our findings also contribute to a literature (Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean 
(1998)) which maintains that financial market participants behave in accordance with the 
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  As we will see below, prospect theory 
predicts that investors are most likely to engage in irrational early exercise behavior after 
exceeding a reference point or after a large gain.  Consequently, our findings on the triggers of 
irrational early exercise provide evidence that some discount and full service customers exhibit 
behavior that conforms to prospect theory but fail to provide evidence that any firm proprietary 
traders behave in accordance with prospect theory.  We also examine the triggers of rational early 
exercise by the investor classes and find that discount and full services customers act in 
accordance with the predictions of prospect theory while the firm proprietary traders do not.  
Insofar as we are aware, our evidence is the first that prospect theory is operative in the exchange 
traded options market and is also the first that it functions differentially across various classes of 
investors. 
Even though we do not test directly for the impact of irrational early call exercise on the 
prices of securities, our findings have implications for theoretical models which investigate how 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer (2000) for a review of the evidence and the controversy over its interpretation. 
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non-standard investor behavior influences the prices of financial assets.  Barberis and Huang 
(2001) show that the high mean of stock returns, their excessive volatility, and the large cross-
sectional value premium can be explained by a model in which investors become less cautious 
about an individual security after that security experiences a gain or surpasses a dynamically 
determined reference point.  Since our analysis shows that real world investors (as opposed to 
laboratory subjects) behave in this way, our results lend plausibility to the explanation provided 
in Barberis and Huang (2001) for a number of important stock market anomalies.  At the same 
time, the variation in behavior across investor classes that we document suggests that it would be 
interesting to extend the representative investor framework of Barberis and Huang (2001) to one 
that includes heterogeneous agents. 
Our findings are also related to those of Finucane (1997) and Heath, Huddart and Lang 
(1999).  Finucane (1997) provides evidence that there are a large number of irrational early 
exercises of CBOE calls over the 1988-1989 period.  We extend his results by investigating the 
distribution of irrational exercise across investor classes and the events that trigger irrational 
exercise.2  Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) find that the early exercise of executive stock options 
is also triggered by the underlying stock price reaching a yearly high and by positive returns on 
the underlying stock.  Although the Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) results are interesting, their 
interpretation is not straightforward, because an extension of the Black-Scholes model is used as 
the benchmark for assessing executive exercise decisions.  The Black-Scholes benchmark is 
problematic, because the Black-Scholes model is known to perform poorly even when pricing 
liquid, European exchange traded options (Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997).)  This poor 
                                                 
2 We also improve upon Finucane’s paper by avoiding two errors in his methodology which will both be seen below 
to introduce a bias toward misclassifying early exercises as irrational.   
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performance is exacerbated in the case of executive stock options by long maturities and the fact 
that executives cannot hedge (or sell) their options.  The inability to hedge implies that the 
individual risk aversion of each executive impacts the value of holding rather than exercising 
options which is not taken into account by Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The first section discusses the 
relationship between prospect theory and irrational early exercise behavior.  Section two 
describes the data.  The third section develops the procedure that is used to classify early 
exercises as irrational.  Section four presents results on the incidence of irrational exercise 
behavior and analyzes its distribution across investor classes.  The fifth section provides results 
on stock price patterns that trigger irrational exercise.  Section six concludes. 
 
I.  Prospect Theory and Irrational Early Exercise 
 
Prospect theory is an experimentally based descriptive model of decision making under 
uncertainty put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  Prospect theory has three main 
features.  First, agents derive value from gains and losses in wealth from a reference point rather 
than from absolute levels as in traditional utility theory.  Second, people are more sensitive to 
losses than to gains which is known as loss aversion.  Finally, both gains and losses from the 
reference point exhibit diminishing sensitivity.  Panel A of Figure 1 depicts a standard prospect 
theory value function.  The sudden decrease in the slope of the value function at the reference 
point (i.e., the point where there is no gain or loss) is a reflection of loss aversion.  The convexity 
in the region of losses and the concavity in the region of gains occurs because people are less 
sensitive to both gains and losses further from the reference point. 
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Below we will define an early exercise as irrational if an investor would have obtained 
more money (for certain) by selling the option.  Since the standard prospect theory value function 
has a positive slope across the range of losses and gains, investors who behave in strict 
accordance with the standard prospect theory value function will never choose a smaller over a 
larger amount of money.  Hence, such investors will never irrationally exercise options early.  
We can, nonetheless, derive predictions from the standard prospect theory value function about 
the situations under which investors are most likely to make careless decisions that result in a 
loss of value.  The first situation occurs when the reference point is crossed from below.  When 
the reference point is exceeded, there is a marked decrease in the slope of the value function 
which entails that an investor would suddenly care significantly less about throwing away a fixed 
amount of money by executing an irrational early exercise.  The second situation occurs when 
there has been a large gain.  After a large gain, the value function has a small positive slope 
which results in an irrational early exercise causing only a small loss of value for the investor.  
The upshot is that the standard prospect theory value function predicts that the circumstances 
under which it is most likely that investors will carelessly execute irrational early exercises are 
either after a reference point has been exceeded or after a large gain. 
Under prospect theory – as under traditional utility theory – the value functions of 
different investors will vary.  We consider two alternatives to the standard prospect theory value 
function which would result in irrational early exercise (without any carelessness) if investors 
adhered to them strictly.  The slope of the standard prospect theory value function decreases 
suddenly at the reference point.  Panel B of Figure 1 depicts a value function whose slope 
decreases so markedly at the reference point that it becomes negative in the region of small gains.  
An investor whose preferences are described by this value function would exercise irrationally 
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when the reference point is crossed from below.  The slope of the standard prospect theory value 
function reaches its minimum after a large gain.3  Panel C of Figure 1 depicts a value function 
that is so concave in the region of gains, that it becomes negatively sloped for large gains.  An 
investor whose preferences are described by this value function would exercise irrationally after a 
large gain.  It should be borne in mind that the value functions depicted in Panels B and C of 
Figure 1 are both irrational in the sense that they correspond to investors who prefer less to more 
in the regions where the value functions are negatively sloped.  These value functions are, 
nonetheless, worth considering because they have the potential to provide insight into any 
irrational exercise behavior that is observed in the market. 
 
II.  Data 
 
The main data for this paper were obtained from the CBOE.  The data consists of a daily 
record of exercise and volume activity broken down by different types of investors for all CBOE 
listed options from the beginning of January 1996 through the end of December 1999.  When a 
CBOE listed option is also listed on another exchange, the data covers exercises and volume for 
the option from all the exchanges at which it trades.  The different types of investors are discount 
customers, full service customers, and firm proprietary traders.  Brokerage houses are assigned to 
the discount or full service category by an analyst at the CBOE.  E-Trade is an example of a 
discount brokerage house, and Merrill Lynch is an example of a full service brokerage house.  
                                                 
3 The value function of the standard prospect theory investor may also have a positive slope close to zero after a 
large loss.  We do not expect to observe irrational early exercises in this region, however, because call options are 
likely to be out-of-the money after a large loss on either the option or the underlying security. 
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The daily opening, high, low, and closing transaction price for each of the options in the CBOE 
data set were obtained from Prophet Financial Systems. 
The CBOE data contains the ticker symbol for the stock that underlies each option.  This 
ticker symbol is used to extract information on the underlying stock for each option from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) files.  When a given option observation on a 
particular trade date cannot be matched with a CRSP stock, it is dropped from the analysis.  For 
each option on each trade date, the information extracted from CRSP on the underlying stock is 
(1) whether the trade date is an ex-dividend date, (2) the high price for the trade date, (3) the 
daily closing prices for the previous year (adjusted for splits and stock dividends), and (4) the 
daily returns for the previous six months. 
Altogether there are 74,523 distinct call options in the CBOE database where distinct 
calls are defined by an underlying stock, strike price, and expiration date.  These calls were 
written on 708 different underlying stocks.  Table I contains basic descriptive information on the 
call options in the sample, the underlying stock price, and the exercise of the calls.  Discount 
customers exercised 4851 distinct call options on distinct trade dates prior to maturity on which 
the high price of the underlying stock was greater than the strike price.  Full service customers 
had 6458 such exercises, and firm proprietary traders 1834. 
 
III.  Classification of Exercises as Irrational 
 
We now turn to the task of identifying irrational option exercises under the weak 
assumption of  non-satiation – that investors prefer more money to less.  Although we would like 
to enumerate criteria that single out exercises as irrational if and only if they violate this 
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assumption, uncertainty about market imperfections makes this impossible.  Consequently, we 
develop criteria that are satisfied by as many exercises as possible subject to the constraint that 
every identified exercise almost surely violates non-satiation. 
Standard option pricing theory demonstrates that in the absence of market frictions it is 
always irrational to exercise an American call option early except possibly at times immediately 
prior to the underlying stock going ex-dividend (Hull (2000)).  Accordingly, our initial set of 
candidates for irrational exercises are call option exercises with at least one day left to maturity 
on days that are not the trade date before an ex-dividend date for the underlying stock. 
In the presence of market frictions, it is not necessarily irrational for an investor to 
exercise a call option early on a trade date that does not precede an ex-dividend date.  An 
investor who exercises a call option may (1) keep the share in his portfolio at least for a short 
period of time, (2) sell the share immediately to get cash, or (3) use the share to close out a short 
position in the underlying stock.  Since our data do not indicate what investors do with shares 
obtained from exercise, we will only classify an exercise as irrational if it would be irrational 
under all three of these alternatives. 
In order to evaluate the three possibilities, it is necessary to consider the commissions and 
taxes associated with the exercise and sale of calls.  The commission for exercising a call is equal 
to the commission for buying at the strike price the number of shares called.  No taxes are paid 
upon the exercise of a call.  When the investor disposes of the shares obtained from exercising, 
however, capital gains taxes are due.  If the investor sells the shares, a commission is paid on the 
sale and capital gains taxes are paid on the difference between the sale price of the shares and the 
sum of the exercise price and the purchase price of the call.  If the investor uses the shares to 
cover a short position, then capital gains taxes are paid on the difference between the price at 
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which the shares were shorted and the sum of the exercise price and the purchase price of the 
call.  When the shares obtained from call exercise are used to cover a short position there is no 
commission beyond that paid for exercising the call.  The clock for determining whether the 
capital gain is short term or long term starts when the call is exercised regardless of whether the 
shares obtained are sold or are used to cover a short position. 
The commission paid when an investor sells a call is, in general, different than the 
commission paid upon exercise.  When a call is sold, capital gains tax is paid on the difference 
between the sale and the purchase price of the option, and the time that has elapsed between the 
purchase and the sale is used to determine whether the capital gain is short term or long term.  
All commissions discussed in this and the previous paragraph are tax deductible. 
Using these facts about commissions and taxes, we can analyze the investor’s decision to 
exercise a call.  Consider first the possibility that the investor exercises the call early at a time 
that does not immediately precede the underlying stock going ex-dividend and holds the share 
obtained in his portfolio for at least one trade date.  This strategy is strictly dominated by waiting 
to exercise on the next trade date.  Either way the investor pays the exercise premium and obtains 
a share of stock.  By waiting, however, the investor can earn an extra day of risk free return on 
his exercise premium and commission.  Under both scenarios, no tax is paid at the time of 
exercise, and the basis for paying tax when the share is eventually sold is the exercise price plus 
the purchase price of the option. 
Consider next the case where the investor exercises the call and then immediately sells 
the stock to obtain cash.  The investor could have chosen instead simply to sell the call.  If – after 
taking account of bid-ask spreads, commissions, and taxes – the investor would have received 
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more cash from selling the call, then the exercise is irrational.  Hence, the exercise decision is 
irrational if the following inequality is satisfied 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
Bid Bid Purch Sell Call
t t t t t
Bid Bid Purch Exercise Call Sell Stock
t t t t t t t
C C C Comm
S K S K C Comm Comm
τ τ
τ τ τ
− − − −
> − − − − − − − −
 (1) 
where BidtC  is the price that the call can be sold for at time t, 
PurchC  is the price for which the call 
was purchased at some time before t, tτ  is the short term capital gains tax rate at time t,  
Bid
tS  is 
the price that a share of stock can be sold for at time t, K is the exercise price of the call, and 
X
tComm  is the commission for undertaking action X at time t.  The commissions and other 
quantities are all on a per share basis.  The capital gain for exercising the call and then selling the 
stock is short term, because the investor exercises the call and then immediately sells the stock.  
The capital gain associated with selling the call will almost always be short term as well, because 
almost all calls are purchased when their times to expiration are shorter than the period required 
for a capital gain to be long term.  If for a particular exercise the capital gain that would have 
resulted from selling the call would have been long term, then there is a further disincentive for 
exercising the call.  This disincentive arises, because exercising the call converts a long term 
capital gain into a short term capital gain.  Hence, if assuming that the capital gains tax rate in 
inequality (1) is the same for both selling or exercising the call introduces any distortion into the 
assessment of the rationality of exercises, the distortion will be a bias against classifying 
exercises as irrational.  We make this assumption in order to be conservative when deciding 
whether exercises are irrational. 
Using the fact discussed above that the commission for exercising a call is the same as the 
commission for selling a stock (because the commission on stock trades does not generally vary 
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with the stock price or depend upon whether the trade is a buy or a sell), straightforward algebra 
shows that inequality (1) simplifies to 
 ( ) 2 .Bid Bid Sell Call Sell Stockt t t tC S K Comm Comm− − > −  (2) 
If inequality (2) is satisfied, then exercising a call and selling the stock immediately to get cash is 
irrational.  Note that inequality (2) differs from the analogous inequality (3) in Finucane (1997).  
This is because Finucane incorrectly assumes that the commission for selling an option is the 
same as the commission for exercising an option.  As a result, the right hand side of his 
inequality is ( )1Sell Stock tComm τ− −  which can be smaller than our expression and therefore 
introduce a bias toward classifying exercises as irrational.4 
Consider finally the case where an investor exercises a call in order to use the stock 
obtained to cover a short position in the stock.  In this case, the exercise is irrational if the 
investor would have ended up with more money by selling the call and buying the stock to cover 
the short position.  Hence, the exercise decision is irrational if the following inequality is 
satisfied: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1
1
Bid Ask Bid Purch Short Ask Sell Call Buy Stock
t t t t t t t t t
Short Purch Exercise Call
t t t
C S C C S S Comm Comm
K S K C Comm
τ τ τ
τ τ
− − − − − − + −
> − − − − − −
 (3) 
where AsktS  is the price at which a share of stock can be bought at time t, 
ShortS  is the price at 
which the share was shorted at some time before t, and all other variables are as defined above.  
Once again making use of the fact that the commission for exercising a call is the same as that for 
buying a stock, straightforward algebra shows that inequality (3) is equivalent to: 
                                                 
4 Note that Finucane’s expression is always negative while typical commission levels can result in the right hand side 
of inequality (2) being positive. 
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 ( ) .Bid Ask Sell Callt t tC S K Comm− − >  (4) 
There is one difference on the left hand side and one difference on the right hand side of 
inequalities (2) and (4).  On the left hand side, inequality (4) has AsktS  instead of .
Bid
tS   Since the 
ask price is higher than the bid price, this difference will make it more difficult to satisfy 
inequality (4) than inequality (2).  On the right hand side, inequality (4) is missing 
2 .Sell StocktComm−   This will also make inequality (4) more difficult to satisfy.  Consequently, 
inequality (4) implies inequality (2) but not vice-versa.  As a result, in order to classify an 
exercise as irrational, we require inequality (4) to be satisfied.5 
In order to use inequality (4) to classify the rationality of early exercises, we must 
determine an upper bound on the quantity .Sell CalltComm   We did this by surveying commission 
charges from 37 brokerage houses over our data period and found that the greatest commission 
charged for selling options was a flat fee of $40 plus $2 per contract.  This commission implies a 
maximum commission charge on a per share basis when just one call contract is sold.  The 
corresponding maximum commission is $0.42 (since each call contract is for 100 shares.)  
Hence, in order to be conservative we will assume an upper bound on Sell CalltComm  of $0.42.
6 
Another issue that arises when empirically implementing inequality (4) is that we do not 
know at what point during the day exercise orders are issued.  The Options Clearing Corporation 
                                                 
5 Finucane (1997) does not consider the possibility that an investor exercises a call to use the stock obtained to cover 
a short position.  This omission also biases Finucane’s procedure toward misclassifying early call exercises as 
irrational, because it is the situation under which it is least likely that the investor is behaving irrationally (i.e., 
inequality (4) implies inequality (2) but not vice-versa),  
6 As a robustness check, we also ran the tests below assuming an upper bound increased by 50 cents to $0.92.  This 
change did not alter any of the main features of our results.  It might also make sense to use a lesser upper bound for 
discount customers and firm proprietary traders.  We did not do this, because (1) we are not certain how much to 
reduce the upper bound for these customers and (2) the results reported in Table II below suggest that lesser upper 
bounds for these investors would not make much of a difference. 
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assigns exercised calls to call writers at the end of the day, and the assigned call writers then have 
a fixed number of business days to deliver the underlying shares.  Consequently, if the call 
owners could not short the underlying stock, then it would always be rational for them to exercise 
as late in the day as possible in order to retain the option of foregoing exercise if the underlying 
stock price moves adversely (e.g., to below the strike price) during the remainder of the day.  
However, since the investors can, in fact, short the underlying asset, it can potentially be rational 
to simultaneously place an exercise order and short a corresponding number of share at some 
time other than the end of the day.  This pair of actions would lock in a cash flow equal to the 
difference between the stock price at the time of exercise and the strike price regardless of how 
the stock price moves subsequently. 
Ideally, time-stamped data on BidtC  and 
Ask
tS  would be available.  If this were the case, 
then we would select the minimum value attained by Bid Askt tC S−  at any point during the day to 
use in inequality (4).  For most of our data period, however, time-stamped data is not available 
on CBOE options.  Accordingly, in order to ensure that we do not misclassify any possibly 
rational exercise as irrational, we set AsktS  and 
Bid
tC  in inequality (4) to, respectively, the stock’s 
high transaction price during the day, ,HightS  and the calls low transaction price during the day 
.LowtC   The value of 
High
tS  almost certainly reflects a transaction at the ask price, and the value of 
Low
tC  almost certainly reflects a transaction at the bid price.  Since the call price will tend to be at 
its highest value of the day when the stock price is at its highest value, it is likely that the 
computed value Low Hight tC S−  is smaller than the minimum value during the day of .
Bid Ask
t tC S−   
Consequently, it is improbable that the use of Low Hight tC S−  as a proxy for the minimum value that 
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Bid Ask
t tC S−  attains during the day will lead to the misclassification of any possibly rational 
exercises as irrational. 
Combining the foregoing considerations on commissions and intraday exercise, we will 
classify early call exercises on non-ex-dividend trade dates as irrational when they satisfy 
 ( ) $0.42.Low Hight tC S K− − >  (5) 
In order to ensure that stale prices are not used to conclude that an exercise is irrational, we do 
not classify an exercise as irrational if the closing transaction price for the call or the high price 
for the underlying stock are not available on the trade date of the exercise.  For the same reason, 
we require that at least 10 contracts of the call were transacted on the trade date of the exercise.  
Finally, we exclude from the irrational category call exercises that occur on trade dates for which 
the high stock price is less than the strike price, because these exercises may correspond to data 
errors. 
The discussion below will be facilitated by explicitly stating the conditions that an option 
exercise on a particular trade date must meet in order for it to be classified as irrational and by 
defining classes of exercises as irrational or rational in terms of these conditions.  An observed 
option exercise will be classified as irrational if and only if 
(C1)  The option is a call. 
(C2)  The call is not at its expiration date. 
(C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the underlying stock. 
(C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and the daily high 
transaction price for the underlying stock. 
(C5)  The daily trading volume for the call is at least 10 contracts.7 
(C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s strike price. 
                                                 
7 Requiring that at least 50 contracts of the call were transacted on the trade date of the exercise does not change any 
of the main features of our results. 
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(C7)  The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42.Low Hight tC S K− − >  
 
Option exercises that conform to (C1)-(C6) will be referred to as potentially rational or 
irrational exercises.  Potentially rational or irrational exercises that also satisfy (C7) will be 
referred to as irrational exercises.  Potentially rational or irrational exercises that do not satisfy 
(C7) will be referred to as rational exercises.  According to this taxonomy, many exercises will 
be neither rational nor irrational since many exercises do not satisfy (C1)-(C6).  Some of these 
unclassified exercises may be irrational.  It is also possible that because of the conservative way 
criterion (C7) was developed, exercises which we categorize as rational are, in fact, irrational. 
 
IV.  Irrational Exercise Behavior and its Distribution across Investor Classes 
 
This section of the paper analyzes the quantity of irrational exercise behavior in our 
sample and its distribution across the investor classes.  We begin by determining the number of 
irrational exercises by each class of investors.  We then evaluate these numbers by comparing 
them to the number of rational exercises by each investor class and to the number of 
opportunities that each investor class had to exercise irrationally. 
Our data provide us with the number of contracts exercised by each type of investor on 
each trade date for each type of call, where a type of call is defined by an underlying stock, a 
strike price, and an expiration date.  When one of the investor classes exercises more than one 
contract of some type of call on a given trade date, we do not know whether this corresponds to 
exercise orders from one or more investors.  As a result, the unit of analysis for this section of the 
paper will be a type of call on a particular trade date which we will refer to as a call-trade date.  
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Whenever we observe an investor class exercising a strictly positive number of contracts of some 
type of call on a trade date, we count that as one exercise for that class of investors on that call-
trade date. 
To illustrate, suppose that on June 23, 1998, discount customers exercised a total of 25 
calls on IBM with a strike price of 40 that expire in July 1998, full service customers exercised 
none of these calls, and firm proprietary traders exercised a total of 10 such calls.  Furthermore, 
suppose that these exercises conform to (C1)-(C7).  We would count this exercise data as one 
irrational exercise for discount customers, zero irrational exercises for full service customers, and 
one irrational exercise for firm proprietary traders of the July expiration, 40 strike IBM call on 
June 23, 1998.  Even though we know that there must have been at least two distinct exercise 
orders (and there may have been as many as 65), we will count this data as one exercise for the 
investors aggregated together in order to treat consistently the call-trade date as the unit of 
analysis. 
Next we re-write inequality (5) which must be satisfied in order for a call exercise to be 
classified irrational as 
 ( ) $0.42 0Low Hight tC S K− − − >  (6) 
and define the quantity E  by 
 ( ) $0.42.Low Hight tE C S K≡ − − −  (7) 
Exercises are irrational then, if they conform to (C1)-(C6) and E  is strictly positive.  Table II 
contains the distribution of E  for exercises that satisfy (C1)-(C6) for all investors (Panel A), 
discount customers (Panel B), full service customers (Panel C), and firm proprietary traders 
(Panel D).  Each panel also contains the distribution of E  conditional on 0E >  which 
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corresponds to irrational exercises and conditional on 0E ≤  which corresponds to rational 
exercises. 
Panel A of Table II shows that irrational exercise takes place on 191 call-trade dates in 
our sample.  Hence, it is a regular occurrence.  This finding is consistent with the results reported 
in Finucane (1997) for CBOE exercises over the 1988-1989 period.  Our results, however, add to 
what is already known from Finucane (1997), because (as noted in the previous section) his 
methodology is biased toward misclassifying exercises as irrational.  Our results also extend 
those in Finucane (1997) by breaking down the irrational exercise behavior by classes of 
investors.  Panels B through D of Table II indicate that there are 85 irrational exercises by 
discount customers, 110 irrational exercises by full service customers, and zero irrational 
exercises by firm proprietary traders.  The raw numbers of irrational exercises show that discount 
customers and full service customers habitually engage in irrational exercise behavior while firm 
proprietary traders do not. 
Figures 2 and 3 display bar charts of, respectively, the number of rational and irrational 
exercises as a function of the number of calendar days to expiration for each investor type.  A 
comparison of the figures reveals that rational early exercises are more concentrated near option 
expiration than irrational early exercises.  The more uniform distribution of the irrational 
exercises with respect to option expiration suggests that some exogenous factors may be 
triggering irrational exercise.  This possibility will be explored in the next section.    Figure 3 
does not provide a chart for firm proprietary traders, because this class of investors had no 
exercises that satisfied criteria (C1)-(C7).  Omitted analogous charts for all early call exercises 
(i.e., those where conditions (C3)-(C7) are not imposed) look very similar to those in Figure 2 for 
the rational exercises. 
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We assess whether the propensity to exercise irrationally varies across the investor classes 
in two ways.  The first approach examines whether the exercises of one investor class are more 
likely to be irrational than those of the other classes.  To determine whether this is the case, we 
compute the percentage of potentially rational or irrational exercises that actually are irrational.  
More specifically, we determine the percentage of exercises that conform to (C1)-(C6) which 
also satisfy (C7).  Panel A of Table III reports for all investors and for each investor type the 
percentage of potentially rational or irrational exercises that are actually irrational.  For all 
investors, 2.14% of potentially rational or irrational exercises are actually irrational.  This 
percentage is 2.57% for discount customers, 2.32% for full service customers, and zero percent 
for firm proprietary traders. 
Permutation tests were conducted to determine whether the observed differences in the 
percentages between pairs of investor classes are likely to occur by chance if there is no 
difference in the true underlying distribution of percentages across pairs of investors.  For 
example, to evaluate the statistical significance of the observed difference in the percentages 
exercised irrationally by discount customers and full service customers, we begin by pooling 
together the 3303 call-trade dates on which discount customers exercised and the 4745 call-trade 
dates on which full service customers exercised.  When both discount and full service customers 
exercised on the same call-trade date, it is included in the pool twice.  We then 
(1) Randomly choose 3303 call-trade dates (without replacement) from the pool 
and treat them as the discount customer observations.  We treat the other 
4745 call-trade dates as the full service customer observations. 
 
(2) Compute the difference of the percentage of observations assigned to 
discount customers that are irrational and the percentage of observations that 
are assigned to full service customers that are irrational. 
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Steps (1) and (2) are repeated 1000 times, and we count the number of times that the difference 
computed in step (2) exceeds the actual in-sample difference of 0.25%.  In the test for the 
discount customers and the full service customers, the difference was greater than 0.25% 156 
times which yields the p-value of 0.156 reported in Panel B of Table III.  The tests for the other 
pairs of investors were conducted similarly, and the p-values from these tests are also reported in 
Panel B of Table III. 
The permutation tests indicate that the differences in the percentages between discount 
and full service customers is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  It is surprising 
that the exercises of full service customers who receive professional advice are not less likely to 
be irrational than those of discount customers who do not receive such advice.  In fact, it is 
puzzling that full service customers are not altogether prevented from making obviously 
irrational financial decisions by their advisors.  The p-values in the final column of Panel B of 
Table III indicate that it is more likely that discount customer and full service customer exercises 
are irrational than those of firm proprietary traders.   
We next test for the likelihood that various investor classes will act on opportunities to 
exercise either irrationally or rationally.  In order to conduct these tests, we define an irrational 
exercise opportunity for an investor class as a call-trade date for which the investor class has 
strictly positive open interest and for which exercising would satisfy criteria (C1)-(C7).  
Similarly, a rational exercise opportunity for an investor class is defined as a call-trade date for 
which the investor class has strictly positive open interest and for which exercising would satisfy 
criteria (C1)-(C6) but would violate criterion (C7). 
Panel A of Table IV reports by investor class the number of irrational and rational 
exercise opportunities, the number of irrational and rational exercises, and the percentage of 
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irrational and rational exercise opportunities in which exercises were carried out.  Panel B of 
Table IV reports the results of permutation tests for the significance of differences in these 
percentages across investor classes.  Discount customers exercise on 0.035% of their irrational 
exercise opportunities and full service customers exercise on 0.041% of such opportunities.  Firm 
proprietary traders exercise on none of their 46,261 irrational exercise opportunities.  The p-
values in Panel B indicate that the difference in the percentage between discount and full service 
customers is not significant while the difference in the percentage between either discount 
customers or full service customers and firm proprietary traders is statistically significant.  
Hence, given the opportunity to exercise irrationally, discount and full service customers are 
significantly more likely to act on it than firm proprietary traders. 
Panel A of Table IV indicates that discount customers act on 1.31% of their opportunities 
to exercise rationally while full service customers act on 1.66% of such opportunities and firm 
proprietary traders act on 2.69% of rational exercise opportunities.  The difference in percentages 
between each pair of investor types is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Accordingly, firm proprietary traders who have the lowest propensity for irrational exercise have 
the highest propensity for rational exercise. 
 
V.  Reference Points, Past Returns, and Irrational Exercise 
 
 This section of the paper investigates whether irrational exercise for the various investor 
classes is triggered by the underlying asset crossing dynamically defined reference points or 
experiencing a period of positive or negative returns.  We address these issues by performing 
logit regressions where the dependent variable indicates whether an irrational exercise has 
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occurred and the independent variables either signify whether the price of the underlying stock 
has crossed a reference point or contain information on the accumulated past returns on the 
underlying asset.  We focus on the price and return paths of the underlying assets rather than that 
of the calls.  We do so, because most options on individual equities are illiquid when expirations 
are longer than a couple of months so that for most exercises it would be impossible to get 
reliable past time series of prices or returns on the exercised calls. 
In the present context the call-trade date is not an appropriate unit of analysis, because on 
a given trade date all calls written on the same stock would have exactly the same values for the 
dependent variables that are defined in terms of the price path of the underlying asset.  The 
resulting multicollinearity would make it difficult to interpret any findings.  For this reason, we 
choose stock-trade dates as the unit of analysis for the regressions where a stock-trade date refers 
to all calls on a given trade date that are written on a particular underlying stock.  In the 
regressions below, we include stock-trade dates only if the investor class under consideration has 
strictly positive open interest on at least one call written on the underlying stock that conforms to 
criteria (C1)-(C7) (i.e., whose exercise would be classified as irrational.) 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one when an investor class 
has at least one exercise of a call that satisfies (C1)-(C7) which is written on a specific 
underlying stock on a particular trade date: 
 
1 if investor class  exercises a (C1)-(C7) call on stock   on trade date 
0 if investor class  has open interest in but no exercises of these calls
Irrational
ijt
i j t
Exercise
i

= 

 (8)  
The subscript i denotes either all investors, discount customers, or full service customers.8 
                                                 
8 We do not run the regressions for firm proprietary traders, because this class of investors has no exercises which 
conform to (C1)-(C7). 
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The first independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the closing 
price of the underlying stock on trade date t is strictly higher than any of the daily closing prices 
of the underlying stock over the past 52 weeks. 
 
1 if closing price of stock  on trade date  is a 52 week high 
0 otherwisejt
j t
RefPoint = 

 (9) 
 
Stock splits and stock dividends are taken into account when computing this variable.  The next 
set of independent variables are cumulative returns on the underlying asset over various time 
periods prior to the exercise on trade date t. 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 5 through 1jtRetWeek1 j t t= − −  (10) 
2 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 10 through 6jtRetWeek j t t= − −  (11) 
3 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 15 through 11jtRetWeek j t t= − −  (12) 
4 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 20 through 16jtRetWeek j t t= − −  (13) 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 42 through 21jtRetMonth2 j t t= − −  (14) 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 126 through 43jtRetMonth3To6 j t t= − −  (15) 
 
We also include a control variable on the right hand side of the regressions.  This variable 
provides a measure of the average cash flow that would be lost from exercising rather than 
selling each of the N option held by investor class i on trade date t that are written on stock j and 
which satisfy (C1)-(C7): 
 ( ) 1
1 N
ijt kijtClose
kjt
CashFlowLoss E
N S =
=   (16) 
where ClosejtS  is the closing price of stock j on trade date t and kijtE  is the value from equation (7) 
on trade date t for the thk  option on stock j held by investor class i that satisfies (C1)-(C7).  
Scaling by the stock price standardizes the cash flow loss across different stocks. 
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Now that all of the necessary variables have been defined, we turn to the analysis of the 
following regression equation: 
0 1 2 3 4 52 3 4
Irrational
ijt jt jt jt jt jtExercise RefPoint RetWeek1 RetWeek RetWeek RetWeekβ β β β β β= + + + + +
 
 6 7 8jt jt ijt tRetMonth2 RetMonth3To6 CashFlowLossβ β β ε+ + + +  (17) 
Descriptive statistics on the variables in equation (17) are provided in Table V. 
Table VI presents estimates of this regression equation when all of the investors are 
aggregated into one class as well as for discount customers and full service customers separately.  
The estimate on the reference point variable is significantly positive in all three regressions 
which provides evidence that a 52 week high price for the underlying stock triggers irrational 
exercise by discount customers and full service customers.  This is true even though there are 
controls for the return of the underlying stock over various periods leading up to the potential 
exercise and for the cash flow difference between exercising and selling calls. 
The discount customer and full service customer regressions both have positive 
coefficient estimates for all of the past return variables.  Four of these six coefficients from each 
regression are statistically significant at conventional levels and the other coefficients are all 
close to statistically significant.  The positive coefficient estimates are consistent with irrational 
option exercise by discount customers and full service customers being triggered by positive 
stock returns over the corresponding past horizons.  The triggering effect is present over the 
various horizons, even after controlling for returns over the other horizons, for the underlying 
stock  price being at its yearly high, and for the cash flow difference between exercising and 
selling the option. 
As explained in Section I above, the standard prospect theory value function predicts that 
investors are most likely to carelessly execute irrational early exercises either after a reference 
24  
point has been exceeded or after a positive gain.  Our finding that irrational early exercise is 
triggered for discount and full service customers by the underlying asset exceeding its 52 week 
high or by a period of gains on the underlying asset indicates that at least a subset of discount and 
full service customers behave in accordance with this prediction of prospect theory.  An 
alternative interpretation of these findings is that at least some subset of discount customers and 
full service customers have prospect theory value functions like those depicted in Panels B and C 
of Figure 1.  According to this interpretation, investors behave in accordance with value 
functions that sometimes reflect a preference for less over more.  To the best of our knowledge, 
our results provide the first evidence that prospect theory is operative in the exchange traded 
options market and that it applies differentially to various classes of investors. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) incorporate recent experimental evidence that investor 
cautiousness depends dynamically on prior gains and losses into a theoretical asset pricing 
model.  In particular, they make use of experimental evidence that a loss that is preceded by gains 
causes a smaller loss in utility than one that is preceded by losses.  Barberis and Huang show that 
combining this dynamic loss aversion with narrow framing in which investors evaluate the gains 
or losses on each stock in their portfolios separately produces equilibrium stock returns that have 
high mean, excessive volatility, and a large cross-sectional value premium.  Hence, dynamic loss 
aversion and narrow framing can account for many of the important stock market anomalies.  
Our findings that irrational early exercise is triggered by the underlying stock price being at its 
yearly high and by a period of high returns on the underlying asset provide evidence that 
investors in actual financial markets (as opposed to those in artificial experimental situations) 
make decisions about individual assets less carefully after a dynamically determined reference 
point for the asset has been surpassed or after there has been a period of gains for the asset.  
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Consequently, our findings lend plausibility to the explanation provided in Barberis and Huang 
(2001) for a number of important stock market anomalies.  At the same time, since we do not 
find that firm proprietary traders become less careful after surpassing a yearly high price or after 
high past returns, it would be interesting to extend the representative investor framework of 
Barberis and Huang (2001) to one that also includes agents who do not display dynamic loss 
aversion or narrow framing.9 
We next investigate whether the events that trigger irrational option exercise also trigger 
the option exercises which we classify as rational.  In order to explore this issue, we run the logit 
regressions for stock-trade dates on which an investor class is long options whose exercise would 
be rational (i.e., is long options that satisfy (C1)-(C6) and that have an E value less than or equal 
to zero.)  In these regressions the ijtExercise  variable is redefined as follows: 
 
1 if class  exercises a (C1)-(C6), 0 call on stock   on date 
0 if class  has open interest in but no exercises of these calls
Rational
ijt
i E j t
Exercise
i
≤
= 

 (18) 
The subscript i denotes either all investors, discount customers, full service customers, or firm 
proprietary traders.  Table VII presents coefficient estimates for the regressions when 
Rational
ijtExercise  is the dependent variable.  As for the case of irrational exercises, the discount 
customers and the full service customers have coefficients on the reference point variable and all 
of the past returns variables that are positive.  Now all of these coefficient estimates are 
significant at the one percent level with the exception of one of the past return variables for the 
full service customers which is close to statistically significant.  Hence, for discount customers 
                                                 
9 The Barberis and Huang (2001) model is in discrete time with each time step corresponding to one year.  
Consequently, their dynamically evolving reference point is set to an asset’s value one year ago.  The reference point 
that we investigate, by contrast, is the highest price of the underlying asset over the past year.  In light of our 
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and full service customers the option exercises which we classify as rational are triggered by the 
same events as the irrational option exercises. 
 These triggers of rational exercise by discount customers and full service customers are 
also consistent with prospect theory.  To see that this is the case, first note that because of the 
conservative way that we developed the criteria for classifying exercises, a number of the 
exercises that we classify as rational may, in fact, be irrational.  Insofar as this is the case, 
investors who behave in accordance with prospect theory may become more careless after 
exceeding a reference point or after a positive gain, as explained above, and execute irrational 
exercises that have been misclassified as rational. 
 Prospect theory also predicts that exercises which are properly classified as rational – 
those for which an investor receives more cash by exercising than selling the call – will have 
more of a tendency to occur after a reference point is exceeded or after a period of gains.  To 
understand why this is the case, consider once again the standard prospect theory value function 
in Panel A of Figure 1.  This value function abruptly switches from convex to concave when the 
reference point is exceeded, and it becomes uniformly more concave (i.e., the convexity 
decreases or the concavity increases) as one moves from left to right on the figure.  As with 
standard utility functions, investors are risk-seeking when the value function is convex and risk-
averse when the value function is concave.  Consequently, when investors move from below to 
above the reference point, ceterus paribus, they suddenly switch from preferring risky gambles 
over certain payments to preferring certain payments over risky gambles.  More generally, as the 
value function becomes less convex or more concave, investors become more risk-averse.  
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence, it would also be interesting to incorporate a reference point of the highest price over the past year into a 
continuous time version of the Barberis and Huang model.  
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Hence, as their level of loss relative to a reference point decreases or their level of gain relative to 
a reference point increases, their preference for certain payments over risky gambles increases.  
As a result, prospect theory predicts that investors will have a tendency to trade the risky gamble 
inherent in holding a call option for the sure payment that is obtained by selling the call or 
exercising the call and disposing of the called stock when they exceed a reference point or when 
there is a gain (i.e., a decrease in losses or an increase in gains.)  If the exercises we classify as 
rational are indeed ones for which an investor obtains more cash by exercising the call and 
disposing of the called stock than by selling the call, then prospect theory predicts that investors 
will have a greater propensity to engage in rational exercise after a reference point has been 
exceeded or after a period of gains.  Hence, our findings on the triggers of rational exercise by 
discount customers and full service customers are consistent with these investors behaving in 
accordance with the standard prospect theory value function. 
 Next we consider the triggers of rational exercise for firm proprietary traders.  The final 
column of Table VII contains the rational exercise regression estimates for firm proprietary 
traders.  The coefficient on the reference point variable is close to zero and statistically 
insignificant.  This coefficient estimate indicates that – unlike for the other investors – exercise is 
not triggered for the firm proprietary traders by the underlying asset attaining a yearly high price.  
The coefficients on the past return variables are all negative and statistically significant.   These 
coefficient estimates indicate that firm proprietary trader exercise is triggered by past negative 
returns on the underlying asset.  This stands in contrast to the discount customers and full service 
customers whose exercise is triggered by positive returns on the underlying asset.  The results on 
the triggers of rational exercise by firm proprietary traders violate both of the predictions of 
prospect theory.  Hence, the results from the triggers of rational exercise, like those from the 
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triggers of irrational exercise, indicate that discount customers and full service customers behave 
in accordance with prospect theory while firm proprietary traders do not. 
 The last issue that we investigate is the relationship between alternative definitions of the 
reference point and irrational exercise behavior.  Until now the reference point has been taken to 
be the highest closing pricing of the underlying stock over the previous 52 weeks.  Table VIII 
reports the results of re-running the irrational exercise regressions from Table VI with the 
reference point set to either 75 percent, 50 percent, or 25 percent of the highest closing price over 
the previous 52 weeks.  In order to conserve space, only the coefficients on the reference point 
variable are reported.  For ease of comparison, the first row of Table VIII reports the coefficients 
from the previous regressions using the original definition of the reference point variable.  The 
second row reports this coefficient when the reference point variable is set to one if the current 
stock price is greater than or equal to 75 percent and less than 100 percent of the high closing 
price of the stock over the past 52 weeks.  With this change, each of the coefficient estimates 
decreases from its estimate under the original definition of the variable and becomes statistically 
insignificant.  This decrease in the coefficient continues when the reference point is redefined as 
being between 50 percent and 75 percent or between 25 percent and 50 percent of the high 
closing price of the stock over the past 52 weeks.  Consequently, it appears that 100 percent of 
the high closing price of the stock over the past 52 weeks is the reference point that is being used 
by the investors. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
 This paper studies the early exercise of CBOE listed options by customers of discount 
brokers, customers of full service brokers, and firm proprietary traders over the 1996 through 
1999 period.  Early exercise activity is interesting, because it provides a setting in which 
irrational investor behavior can be identified simply by comparing the cash flow from exercising 
an option to the cash flow from selling it.  As a result, it provides an opportunity to investigate 
the irrational behavior of investors in actual financial markets without making any assumption 
about a model of market equilibrium. 
Our first major finding is that a large number of early exercises can unambiguously be 
identified as irrational, and irrational early exercise behavior is not uniformly distributed among 
the various classes of investors.  Customers of discount brokers and customers of full service 
brokers both engage in a significant number of irrational exercises.  Traders at large investment 
houses, on the other hand, exhibit no irrational early exercise behavior.  This first finding is a 
noteworthy addition to the existing pool of evidence on irrational investor behavior, because the 
interpretation of it as a manifestation of investor irrationality requires only the very weak 
assumption that investors prefer more money to less. 
Our second major finding is that irrational exercise is triggered for discount and full 
service customers both by the underlying stock price attaining its highest level over the past year 
and by the underlying stock having high returns over various past periods.  Each of these events 
triggers irrational exercise even after controlling for the other event.  Prospect theory predicts that 
investors are most likely to engage in irrational early exercise behavior after exceeding a 
reference point or after a large gain.  Consequently, our findings on the triggers of irrational early 
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exercise provide evidence that some discount and full service customers exhibit behavior that 
conforms to prospect theory but fail to provide evidence that any firm proprietary traders behave 
in accordance with prospect theory.  An examination of the triggers of rational early exercise by 
the investor classes also suggests that discount and full services customers are prospect theory 
agents while firm proprietary traders are not.  We believe these findings provide the first 
evidence that prospect theory applies to the options market as well as the first evidence that it 
operates differentially for various classes of investors. 
 This paper contains no direct evidence on whether irrational investor behavior influences 
the prices at which securities trade.  The findings do, however, have implications for theoretical 
models that investigate how nonstandard investor behavior impacts equilibrium asset prices.  
Barberis and Huang (2001) show that combining dynamic loss aversion with narrow framing in 
which investors evaluate the gains or losses on each stock in their portfolios separately produces 
equilibrium stock returns that have high mean, excessive volatility, and a large cross-sectional 
value premium.  Hence, dynamic loss aversion and narrow framing can account for many of the 
important stock market anomalies.  Our findings that irrational early exercise is triggered by the 
underlying stock price being at its yearly high and by a period of high returns on the underlying 
asset provide evidence that investors in actual financial markets (as opposed to those in artificial 
experimental situations) make decisions about individual assets less carefully after a dynamically 
determined reference point for the asset has been surpassed or after there has been a period of 
gains for the asset.  Consequently, our findings lend plausibility to the explanation provided in 
Barberis and Huang (2001) for a number of important stock market anomalies.  At the same time, 
the variation in behavior across investor classes that we document suggests that it would be 
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interesting to extend the representative investor framework of Barberis and Huang (2001) to one 
that includes heterogeneous agents. 
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 Table I 
Descriptive Statistics on Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Calls, Call Exercises, 
and Underlying Stocks, January 1996 – December 1999 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on CBOE calls, call exercises, and underlying stocks 
over the period January 1996 – December 1999.  Data on call exercises by the investor classes 
were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on daily high stock prices, daily stock closing 
prices, stock returns, and stock splits and dividends are from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial Systems.  Panel A reports 
the number of early exercises of distinct call options on distinct trade dates by customers of 
discount brokers, customers of full service brokers, and firm proprietary traders for which the 
daily high price of the underlying stock exceeds the call’s strike price.  The third column of Panel 
A reports the number of such exercises when it is also the case that at least ten contracts of the 
call transacted on the trade date of the exercise.  Panel B provides descriptive statistics on a 
number of variables of interest.  The first two rows provide information on the number of calls 
per stock and the daily trading volume per call for all calls on trade dates where there is at least 
one trade date until expiration.  The remaining rows of Panel B are computed for trade dates on 
which there is an early call exercises for which the daily high price of the underlying stock is 
greater than the call’s strike price.  These rows provide descriptive statistics at the time of 
exercise on the maturity of the calls, the closing call prices, the closing price of the underlying 
stock, the ratio of the closing price of the underlying stock on the trade date of exercise to its 
highest closing price over the previous 52 weeks, and the underlying stock’s highest transaction 
price on the day of exercise minus its closing price on the day of exercise. 
 Table I – Continued 
 
Panel A:  Number of Early Exercises of Distinct Calls on Distinct Trade Dates by Investor 
Classes 
 
 Any number of contracts of the 
call trade on the date of exercise 
At least ten contracts of the call 
trade on the date of exercise 
Discount Customer Exercises 4581 3394 
Full Service Customer Exercises 6458 4913 
Firm Proprietary Trader Exercises 1834 1798 
 
Panel B:  Call Option and Underlying Stock Descriptive Statistics 
 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th percentile Mean Std. 
Calls/stock 1 3 6 4.533 5.69 
Call trading volume (contracts) 3 10 31 217.95 29376 
Maturity at exercise (days) 2 8 22 17.405 27.68 
Daily closing call price ($) 5 10.75 24.25 21.062 33.71 
Daily closing stock price ($) 25.125 40.5 61.813 45.740 28.84 
Closing stock price on day of 
exercise/ Highest daily closing 
price over previous 52 weeks 
0.767 0.898 0.967 0.842 0.17 
Stocks high price minus closing 
price on exercise date ($) 
0.1875 0.438 0.875 0.773 1.41 
 
 Table II 
Distribution of ( )≡ Low Hight tE C - S - K - $0.42  for Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Call Exercises, January 1996 – December 1999 
 
 
This table presents the distribution of ( )Low Hight tE C - S - K - $0.42≡  for CBOE call option 
exercises over the period January 1996 – December 1999 for all investors aggregated together as 
well as separately for discount customers, full service customers, and firm proprietary traders.  
Data on call exercises by the investor classes were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on 
ex-dividend dates of underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial 
Systems.  The option exercises which are included are those for which:  (C1)  The option is a 
call; (C2)  The call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date 
for the underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call 
and the daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for 
the call is at least ten contracts; and (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds 
the call’s strike price.  Panel A records the distribution of E , the distribution of E  conditional 
on E  being strictly positive, and the distribution of E conditional on E  being zero or negative 
for all investors.  Panel B computes these distributions for customers of discount brokers, Panel 
C for customers of full service brokers, and Panel D for firm proprietary traders. 
  
Table II – Continued 
 
E Obs. Mean Std. Min 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99% Max 
Panel A:  All Investors 
All 8915 -2.420  4.891 -95.357 -23.170 -4.170 -2.358 -1.420 -0.920 -0.608   0.955 35.580 
0≤  8724 -2.517  4.862 -95.357 -23.545 -4.295 -2.420 -1.420 -0.920 -0.670 - 0.295 -0.045 
0>  191  2.024  4.092  0.018  0.018  0.080  0.330  0.892  1.830  4.830  26.892 35.580 
Panel B:  Discount Customers 
All 3303 -2.858  5.409 -95.357 -24.795 -5.483 -2.795 -1.545 -0.920 -0.670   1.080 15.205 
0≤  3218 -2.967  5.428 -95.357 -25.170 -5.608 -2.858 -1.545 -0.983 -0.670 - 0.233 -0.045 
0>   85  1.274  2.002  0.018  0.018  0.080  0.205  0.642  1.705  2.580  15.205 15.205 
Panel C:  Full Service Customers 
All 4745 -2.591  5.333 -91.607 -26.420 -4.295 -2.545 -1.545 -0.920 -0.670   1.080 35.580 
0≤  4635 -2.713  5.280 -91.607 -26.545 -4.420 -2.545 -1.545 -0.983 -0.670 - 0.233 -0.045 
0>  110  2.559  5.043  0.018  0.018  0.142  0.330  0.955  2.205  6.955  26.892 35.580 
Panel D:  Firm Proprietary Traders 
All 1685 -1.374  1.443 -26.295 -7.420 -2.170 -1.545 -1.045 -0.795 -0.670 - 0.482 -0.233 
0≤  1685 -1.374  1.443 -26.295 -7.420 -2.170 -1.545 -1.045 -0.795 -0.670 - 0.482 -0.233 
0>  0 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
 
 Table III 
Percentage of Potentially Rational or Irrational Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Call Exercises that are Actually Irrational by Investor Type, January 1996-December 1999 
 
 
This table reports the percentage of potentially rational or irrational CBOE call exercises by all 
investors, discount customers, full service customers, and firm proprietary traders that are 
actually irrational over the period January 1996 – December 1999.  Data on call exercises by the 
investor classes were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on ex-dividend dates of the 
underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices.  
Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial Systems.  Potentially rational or 
irrational exercises are those exercises which meet the following criteria:  (C1)  The option is a 
call; (C2)  The call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date 
for the underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call 
and the daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for 
the call is at least ten contracts; and (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds 
the call’s strike price.  The quantity ( ) $0.42Low Hight tE C S K≡ − − −  is computed for each option 
exercise that is a potentially rational or irrational, and those for which 0E >  are classified as 
actually irrational.  Panel A reports the number of potentially rational or irrational exercises, 
actually irrational exercises, and percentage of potentially rational or irrational exercises that are 
actually irrational for all investors as well as for discount customers, full service customers, and 
firm proprietary traders.  Panel B reports the p-values from permutation tests for the equality of 
the percentages reported in Panel A for different investor classes.  The p-values are the 
probabilities that the percentages of two investor types are as different as observed under the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the true distributions of the percentages. 
 Table III – Continued 
 
Panel A:  Potentially Rational or Irrational Exercises and Actually Irrational Exercises by 
Investor Types 
 
 All Investors Discount 
Customers 
Full Service 
Customers 
Firm Proprietary 
Traders 
Potentially Rat. or Irrat. Exercises 8915 3303 4745 1685 
Actually Irrational Exercises 191 85 110 0 
Percentage Actually Irrational 2.14% 2.57% 2.32% 0% 
 
 
Panel B:  Permutation Test p-Values for Differences in Percentage Actually Irrational Exercises 
for Pairs of Investor Classes 
 
 Discount Customers Full Service Customers Firm Proprietary Traders 
Discount Customers X 0.156 0.000 
Full Service Customers X X 0.000 
Firm Proprietary Traders X X X 
 Table IV 
Percentage of Irrational and Rational Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Exercise 
Opportunities that Result in Exercise by Investor Type, January 1996-December 1999 
 
 
This table reports the percentage of irrational and rational CBOE call exercise opportunities that 
actually result in exercise by discount customers, full service customers, and firm proprietary 
traders over the period January 1996 – December 1999.  Data on call exercises by the investor 
classes were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on ex-dividend dates of the underlying 
stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices.  Data on 
daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial Systems.  First, all options that meet the 
following criteria are identified:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The call is not at its expiration 
date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the underlying stock; (C4)  Data are 
available on the daily low transaction price for the call and the daily high transaction price for the 
underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call is at least ten contracts; and (C6)  
The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s strike price.  Next, the quantity 
( ) $0.42Low Hight tE C S K≡ − − −  is computed for each option.  Those options that meet criteria 
(C1)-(C6) and have 0E >  are defined as irrational exercise opportunities for an investor class if 
its open interest for the option is greater than zero.  Those options that meet criteria (C1)-(C6) 
and have 0E ≤  are defined as rational exercise opportunities for an investor class if its open 
interest for the option is greater than zero.  Panel A presents by investor class the number of 
irrational and rational exercise opportunities, the number of irrational and rational exercises, and 
the percentage of irrational and rational exercise opportunities that result in exercise. Panel B 
reports the p-values from permutation tests for the equality of the percentages of pairs of investor 
 types reported in Panel A for different investor classes.  The p-values are the probabilities that 
the  
 Table IV – Continued 
 
percentages of two investor types are as different as observed under the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference in the true distributions of the percentages. 
 
Panel A:  Irrational and Rational Exercise Opportunities that Result in Exercise 
 
 Discount 
Customers 
Full Service 
Customers 
Firm Proprietary 
Traders 
 Irrational Rational Irrational Rational Irrational Rational 
Opportunities 243,472 245,622 265,565 278,478 46,261 62,649 
Exercised 85 3218 110 4635 0 1685 
Percentage 0.035% 1.31% 0.041% 1.66% 0% 2.69% 
 
 
Panel B:  Permutation Test p-Values for Difference in Percentages for Pairs of Investor Classes 
 
 Discount 
Customers 
Full Service 
Customers 
Firm Proprietary 
Traders 
 Irrational Rational Irrational Rational Irrational Rational 
Discount Customers X X 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Full Service Customers X X X X 0.000 0.000 
Firm Proprietary Traders X X X X X X 
 Table V 
Descriptive Statistics for Logit Regression Variables, January 1996-December 1999 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables constructed over the time period January 
1996 – December 1999 which will be used in logit regressions.  The investors classes that are 
used in constructing the variables are customers of discount brokers, customers of full service 
brokers, and firm proprietary traders.  Data on call exercises and open interest by the investor 
classes were obtained directly from the Chicago Board Options Exchange.  Data on ex-dividend 
dates of the underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial Systems.  The 
dependent variable, / ,Irrational RationalijtExercise  in the logit regressions is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one when investor class i has at least one exercise of an option written on a specific 
underlying stock j on a particular trade date t that satisfies:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The 
call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the 
underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and the 
daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call 
is at least ten contracts; and (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s 
strike price; and (C7/C7’) The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42Low Hight tC S K− − >  
( ) $0.42.Low Hight tC S K− − >   That is,  
( ) ( )/
1 if investor class  exercises a (C1)-(C6) call on stock   on trade date 
for which 0 0
0 if investor i has open interest in but no exercises of 
Irrational Rational Low High Low High
ijt
i j t
Exercise C S K C S K= − − > − − ≤
these calls             





 
 Table V – Continued 
 
The first independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the closing price of 
the underlying stock on trade date t is strictly higher than any of the daily closing prices of the 
underlying stock over the past 52 weeks. 
 
1 if closing price of stock  on trade date  is a 52 week high 
0 otherwisejt
j t
RefPoint = 

  
 
Stock splits and stock dividends are taken into account when computing this variable.  The next 
set of independent variables are cumulative returns on the underlying asset over various time 
periods prior to the exercise on trade date t. 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 5 through 1jtRetWeek1 j t t= − −   
2 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 10 through 6jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
3 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 15 through 11jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
4 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 20 through 16jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 42 through 21jtRetMonth2 j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 126 through 43jtRetMonth3To6 j t t= − −   
 
Finally, there is a control variable.  This variable provides a measure of the average cash flow 
that would be lost from exercising rather than selling each of the N option held by investor class i 
on trade date t that are written on stock j and which satisfy (C1)-(C6): 
 ( ) 1
1 N
ijt kijtClose
kjt
CashFlowLoss E
N S =
=    
where ClosejtS  is the closing price of stock j on trade date t.  In this expression  
( ) $0.42Low Highkijt kt tE C S K= − − −  where 
Low
ktC  is the lowest daily transaction price of the 
thk  
option held on stock j by investor class i that satisfies (C1)-(C6) and HightS  is the highest daily 
transaction price of the underlying stock.  Panel A computes the descriptive  
 Table V – Continued 
 
statistics for those stock-trade dates for which any investor had open interest on an option that 
satisfies (C1)-(C6) and for which ( ) $0.42 0.Low Highkt tC S K− − − >   Panel B computes the 
descriptive statistics for those stock-trade dates for which any investor had open interest on an 
option that satisfies (C1)-(C6) and for which ( ) $0.42 0.Low Highkt tC S K− − − ≤   In all panels, the 
ijtExercise  variables are constructed from just those stock-trades for which the indicated class of 
investors has open interest on options that satisfy (C1)-(C6). 
 
Panel A:  Irrational Exercise Opportunities 
 
Continuous variables 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
RetWeek1 0.014 0.086 -0.030 0.011 0.054 
RetWeek2 0.009 0.084 -0.032 0.007 0.048 
RetWeek3 0.009 0.083 -0.032 0.007 0.047 
RetWeek4 0.008 0.083 -0.033 0.006 0.046 
RetMonth2 0.031 0.159 -0.052 0.029 0.110 
RetMonth3To6 0.134 0.323 -0.030 0.121 0.277 
CashFlowLoss 0.038 0.025 0.020 0.033 0.050 
Binary variables 
 Variable equals 
0 
Variable 
equals 1 
% stock-days when 
variable equals 1 
, Discount CustomersIrrationalijtExercise i =  
118,412 85 0.07 
, Full Service CustomersIrrationalijtExercise i =  
126,746 110 0.08 
, Firm Proprietary TradersIrrationalijtExercise i =  34,519 0 0.00 
RefPoint 119,364 10,807 9.05 
 
 Table V – Continued 
 
Panel B:  Rational Exercise Opportunities 
 
Continuous Variables 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
RetWeek1 0.019 0.090 -0.027 0.015 0.061 
RetWeek2 0.012 0.085 -0.030 0.009 0.051 
RetWeek3 0.010 0.085 -0.031 0.007 0.049 
RetWeek4 0.009 0.084 -0.032 0.006 0.047 
RetMonth2 0.031 0.162 -0.052 0.029 0.112 
RetMonth3To6 0.115 0.327 -0.049 0.108 0.264 
CashFlowLoss -0.027 0.023 -0.035 -0.021 -0.013 
Binary variables 
 Variable 
equals 0 
Variable equals 
1 
% stock-days when 
variable equals 1 
, Discount CustomersRationalijtExercise i =  
113,281 2754 2.43 
, Full Service CustomersRationalijtExercise i =  
123,812 3815 3.08 
, Firm Proprietary TradersRationalijtExercise i =  
38,466 1558 4.05 
RefPoint 119,752 11,888 9.92 
 Table VI 
Logit Regression of Irrational Exercise Opportunities on Explanatory Variables, January 
1996-December 1999 
 
0 1 2 3 4 52 3 4
Irrational
ijt jt jt jt jt jtExercise RefPoint RetWeek1 RetWeek RetWeek RetWeekβ β β β β β= + + + + +
6 7 8jt jt ijt tRetMonth2 RetMonth3To6 CashFlowLossβ β β ε+ + + +  
 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions over the January 1996 – December 1999 time 
period.  The columns of the table present the results of estimating the equation for all investors, 
customers of discount brokers, and customers of full service brokers.  Data on call exercises and 
open interest by the investor classes were obtained directly from the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange.  Data on ex-dividend dates of the underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from 
Prophet Financial Systems.  The dependent variable, ,IrrationalijtExercise  is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one when investor class i has at least one exercise of an option written on a specific 
underlying stock j on a particular trade date t that satisfies:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The 
call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the 
underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and the 
daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call 
is at least ten contracts; (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s 
strike price; and (C7)  The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42 0.Low Hight tC S K− − − >   That 
is,  
1 if investor class  exercises a (C1)-(C7) call on stock   on trade date 
0 if investor class  has open interest in but no exercises of these calls
Rational
ijt
i j t
Exercise
i

= 

 
 Table VI – Continued 
 
The first independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the closing price of 
the underlying stock on trade date t is strictly higher than any of the daily closing prices of the 
underlying stock over the past 52 weeks. 
 
1 if closing price of stock  on trade date  is a 52 week high 
0 otherwisejt
j t
RefPoint = 

  
 
Stock splits and stock dividends are taken into account when computing this variable.  The next 
set of independent variables are cumulative returns on the underlying asset over various time 
periods prior to the exercise on trade date t. 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 5 through 1jtRetWeek1 j t t= − −   
2 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 10 through 6jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
3 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 15 through 11jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
4 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 20 through 16jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 42 through 21jtRetMonth2 j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 126 through 43jtRetMonth3To6 j t t= − −   
 
Finally, there is a control variable.  This variable provides a measure of the average cash flow 
that would be lost from exercising rather than selling each of the N option held by investor class i 
on trade date t that are written on stock j and which satisfy (C1)-(C6): 
 ( ) 1
1 N
ijt kijtClose
kjt
CashFlowLoss E
N S =
=    
where ClosejtS  is the closing price of stock j on trade date t.  In this expression 
( ) $0.42Low Highkijt kt tE C S K= − − −  where 
Low
ktC  is the lowest daily transaction price of the 
thk  
option held on stock j by investor class i that satisfies (C1)-(C6) and HightS  is the highest daily 
transaction price of the underlying stock. 
 Table VI – Continued 
 
 All Traders Discount Customers Full Service Customers 
Constant -6.865 -7.613 -7.326 
 (50.77)** 
 
(36.22)** (41.82)** 
RefPoint 0.683 0.493 0.921 
 (3.60)** 
 
(2.70)* (3.85)** 
RetWeek1 2.358 3.849 1.775 
 (3.19)** 
 
(3.77)** (1.76) 
RetWeek2 2.334 2.903 1.823 
 (3.16)** 
 
(2.69)** (1.85) 
RetWeek3 2.675 2.904 2.404 
 (3.77)** 
 
(2.85)** (2.52)* 
RetWeek4 2.149 1.674 2.377 
 (3.01)** 
 
(1.71) (2.55)* 
RetMonth2 1.914 2.047 1.701 
 (5.09)** 
 
(3.62)** (3.44)** 
RetMonth3To6 0.417 0.306 0.514 
 (2.36)* 
 
(1.45) (2.22)* 
CashFlowLoss 2.218 0.269 2.192 
 (0.76) 
 
(0.06) (0.58) 
Observations 128,896 118,497 126,856 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   
 Table VII 
Logit Regression of Rational Exercise Opportunities on Explanatory Variables, January 
1996-December 1999 
 
0 1 2 3 4 52 3 4
Rational
ijt jt jt jt jt jtExercise RefPoint RetWeek1 RetWeek RetWeek RetWeekβ β β β β β= + + + + +
6 7 8jt jt ijt tRetMonth2 RetMonth3To6 CashFlowLossβ β β ε+ + + +  
 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions over the January 1996 – December 1999 time 
period.  The columns of the table present the results of estimating the equation for all investors, 
customers of discount brokers, customers of full service brokers, and firm proprietary traders.  
Data on call exercises and open interest by the investor classes were obtained directly from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange.  Data on ex-dividend dates of the underlying stocks and daily 
high stock prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options 
prices are from Prophet Financial Systems.  The dependent variable, ,RationalijtExercise  is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one when investor class i has at least one exercise of an option written on 
a specific underlying stock j on a particular trade date t that satisfies:  (C1)  The option is a call; 
(C2)  The call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for 
the underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and 
the daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the 
call is at least ten contracts; (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s 
strike price; and (C7’)  The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42 0.Low Hight tC S K− − − ≤   That 
is,  
1 if investor class  exercises a (C1)-(C6) and (C7') call on stock   on trade date 
0 if investor class  has open interest in but no exercises of these calls
Rational
ijt
i j t
Exercise
i

= 

 
 Table VII – Continued 
 
The first independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the closing price of 
the underlying stock on trade date t is strictly higher than any of the daily closing prices of the 
underlying stock over the past 52 weeks. 
 
1 if closing price of stock  on trade date  is a 52 week high 
0 otherwisejt
j t
RefPoint = 

  
 
Stock splits and stock dividends are taken into account when computing this variable.  The next 
set of independent variables are cumulative returns on the underlying asset over various time 
periods prior to the exercise on trade date t. 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 5 through 1jtRetWeek1 j t t= − −   
2 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 10 through 6jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
3 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 15 through 11jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
4 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 20 through 16jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 42 through 21jtRetMonth2 j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 126 through 43jtRetMonth3To6 j t t= − −   
 
Finally, there is a control variable.  This variable provides a measure of the average cash flow 
that would be lost from exercising rather than selling each of the N option held by investor class i 
on trade date t that are written on stock j and which satisfy (C1)-(C6): 
 ( ) 1
1 N
ijt kijtClose
kjt
CashFlowLoss E
N S =
=    
where ClosejtS  is the closing price of stock j on trade date t.  In this expression 
( ) $0.42Low Highkijt kt tE C S K= − − −  where 
Low
ktC  is the lowest daily transaction price of the 
thk  
option held on stock j by investor class i that satisfies (C1)-(C6) and HightS  is the highest daily 
transaction price of the underlying stock.    
 Table VII – Continued 
 
 
 
 
All  Traders Discount 
Customers 
Full Service 
Customers 
Firm Proprietary 
Traders 
Constant -3.317 -4.308 -3.993 -3.088 
 (158.17)** 
 
(134.05)** (144.52)** (61.27)** 
RefPoint 0.373 0.433 0.437 -0.036 
 (9.07)** 
 
(7.42)** (8.39)** (0.31) 
RetWeek1 2.670 3.298 3.225 -4.298 
 (18.31)** 
 
(15.79)** (17.42)** (10.61)** 
RetWeek2 2.117 2.930 2.384 -2.438 
 (14.03)** 
 
(13.60)** (12.27)** (5.74)** 
RetWeek3 1.420 1.802 1.756 -1.889 
 (9.43)** 
 
(8.22)** (9.08)** (4.52)** 
RetWeek4 1.011 1.378 1.301 -1.621 
 (6.73)** 
 
(6.34)** (6.75)** (3.89)** 
RetMonth2 0.759 0.960 0.900 -0.997 
 (9.70)** 
 
(8.36)** (8.89)** (4.61)** 
RetMonth3To6 0.154 0.367 0.081 -0.510 
 (4.21)** 
 
(7.11)** (1.71) (4.57)** 
CashFlowLoss -6.403 -7.050 -7.062 2.865 
 (13.41)** 
 
(10.63)** (11.91)** (1.85) 
Observations 131,267 116,035 127,627 40,024 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
 Table VIII 
Logit Regression of Irrational Exercise Opportunities on Explanatory Variables Varying 
Reference Point Variable, January 1996-December 1999 
 
0 1 2 3 4 52 3 4
Irrational
ijt jt jt jt jt jtExercise RefPoint RetWeek1 RetWeek RetWeek RetWeekβ β β β β β= + + + + +
6 7 8jt jt ijt tRetMonth2 RetMonth3To6 CashFlowLossβ β β ε+ + + +  
 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions over the January 1996 – December 1999 time 
period for alternative definitions of a reference point explanatory variable.  The columns of the 
table present the results of estimating the equation for all investors, customers of discount 
brokers, and customers of full service brokers.  Data on call exercises and open interest by the 
investor classes were obtained directly from the Chicago Board Options Exchange.  Data on ex-
dividend dates of the underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial 
Systems.  The dependent variable, ,IrrationalijtExercise  is a dummy variable that is equal to one when 
investor class i has at least one exercise of an option written on a specific underlying stock j on a 
particular trade date t that satisfies:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The call is not at its 
expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the underlying stock; (C4)  
Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and the daily high transaction 
price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call is at least ten contracts; 
(C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s strike price; and (C7)  The 
following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42 0.Low Hight tC S K− − − >   That is,  
1 if investor class  exercises a (C1)-(C7) call on stock   on trade date 
0 if investor class  has open interest in but no exercises of these calls
Irrational
ijt
i j t
Exercise
i

= 

 
 Table VIII  – Continued 
 
The first independent variable has four different definitions corresponding to the four rows in the 
table.  The four definitions are 
 
1 if closing price of stock  on trade date  is a 52 week high 
0 otherwisejt
j t
RefPoint = 

 
if closing price of stock  on trade date  is greater than or equal to 75 percent
1
of and less than 100 percent of 52 week high 
0 otherwise
jt
j t
RefPoint


= 


 
if closing price of stock  on trade date  is greater than or equal to 50 percent
1
of and less than 75 percent of 52 week high 
0 otherwise
jt
j t
RefPoint


= 


 
if closing price of stock  on trade date  is greater than or equal to 25 percent
1
of and less than 50 percent of 52 week high 
0 otherwise
jt
j t
RefPoint


= 


 
 
Stock splits and stock dividends are taken into account when computing this variable.  The next 
set of independent variables are cumulative returns on the underlying asset over various time 
periods prior to the exercise on trade date t. 
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 5 through 1jtRetWeek1 j t t= − −   
2 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 10 through 6jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
3 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 15 through 11jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
4 Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 20 through 16jtRetWeek j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 42 through 21jtRetMonth2 j t t= − −   
Cumulative return on stock  for trade dates 126 through 43jtRetMonth3To6 j t t= − −   
 
Finally, there is a control variable.  This variable provides a measure of the average cash flow 
that would be lost from exercising rather than selling each of the N option held by investor class i 
on trade date t that are written on stock j and which satisfy (C1)-(C6): 
 ( ) 1
1 N
ijt kijtClose
kjt
CashFlowLoss E
N S =
=    
 Table VIII – Continued 
 
where ClosejtS  is the closing price of stock j on trade date t.  In this expression 
( ) $0.42Low Highkijt kt tE C S K= − − −  where 
Low
ktC  is the lowest daily transaction price of the 
thk  
option held on stock j by investor class i that satisfies (C1)-(C6) and HightS  is the highest daily 
transaction price of the underlying stock.    
 
RefPoint dummy =1 if: All Traders Discount 
Customers 
 
Full Service 
Customers 
(Closing Price)/(52 Week  High) ≥ 1 0.683 0.493 0.921 
 (3.60)** (2.70)* (3.85)** 
    
0.75 ≤ (Closing Price)/(52 Week  High) < 1 0.222 0.055 0.303 
 (1.43) (0.24) (1.49) 
    
0.50 ≤ (Closing Price)/(52 Week  High) < 0.75 -0.827 -0.353 -1.350 
 (3.30)** (1.07) (3.43)** 
    
0.25 ≤ (Closing Price)/(52 Week  High) < 0.50 -1.209 -1.062 -1.396 
 (2.35)* (1.45) (1.93) 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Prospect theory value functions.  The top graph depicts a standard prospect theory 
value function.  The middle graph depicts a prospect theory value function with an extreme 
decrease in slope at the reference point.  The bottom graph depicts a prospect theory value 
function with extreme concavity for large gains. 
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Panel B: Rational Early Call Exercises by Full Service Customers
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Panel C: Rational Early Call Exercises by Firm Proprietary Traders
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 Figure 2.   Rational early call exercises by number of calendar days left to expiration for 
various investor classes.  This figure depicts the number of rational Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) early call exercises as a function of the number of calendar days left to 
expiration by various investor classes over the period January 1996 through December 1999.   
Data on call exercises by the investor classes were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on 
ex-dividend dates of underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial 
Systems.  An option exercise is classified as rational if:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The call 
is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the underlying 
stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price for the call and daily high 
transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call is at least 
ten contracts; (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s strike price; 
and (C7)  The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42.Low Hight tC S K− − ≤   Panels A, B, and C 
report the distributions of rational exercises for, respectively, discount customers, full service 
customers, and firm proprietary traders. 
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Panel B: Irrational Early Call Exercises by Full Service Customers
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 10
1
10
5
10
9
11
3
11
7
Days to expiration
N
um
be
r 
of
 ir
ra
tio
na
l e
xe
rc
ise
s
 Figure 3.   Irrational early call exercises by number of calendar days left to expiration for 
various investor classes.  This figure depicts the number of irrational Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) early call exercises as a function of the number of calendar days left to 
expiration by various investor classes over the period January 1996 through December 1999.   
Data on call exercises by the investor classes were obtained directly from the CBOE.  Data on 
ex-dividend dates of underlying stocks and daily high stock prices are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices.  Data on daily low options prices are from Prophet Financial 
Systems.  An option exercise is classified as irrational if:  (C1)  The option is a call; (C2)  The 
call is not at its expiration date; (C3)  It is not the day before an ex-dividend date for the 
underlying stock; (C4)  Data are available on the daily low transaction price of the call and the 
daily high transaction price for the underlying stock; (C5)  The daily trading volume for the call 
is at least ten contracts; (C6)  The day’s high price for the underlying stock exceeds the call’s 
strike price; and (C7)  The following inequality is satisfied:  ( ) $0.42.Low Hight tC S K− − >   Panels 
A and B report the distributions of irrational exercises for, respectively, discount customers and 
full service customers. 
